The Conscientious Objector and the First Amendment: There but for the Grace of God.... by Editors, Law Review
The Conscientious Objector and the First
Amendment: There but for the
Grace of God ....
The concept of legislative grace has long been accepted as the basis
of the conscientious objector exemption.1 In Hamilton v. Regents2
and United States v. Macintosh3 the Supreme Court, relying on the
1 Although Congress had always made some special provision for conscientious objectors
when authorizing conscription, the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720,
§ 5 (g), 54 Stat. 899 (1940), provided the broadest exemption known up to that time:
Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to require any person to be
subject to combatant training and service... who, by reason of religious training
and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.
Because there was some question as to whether belief in a deity was required under the
terms of the exemption, compare United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943), with
Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946), Congress,
when substantially reenacting the former law in the Military Training and Service Act of
1948, § 6 (j), 62 Stat. 613 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456 (j) (1964), added:
Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's belief in a
relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological or philo-
sophical views or a merely personal moral code.
For an extensive treatment of the history of the exemption see generally U.S. SELECTIVE
SERVICE SYSTEM, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 29-65 (Special Monograph No. 11, 1950); Conklin,
The Conscientious Objector Exemption: A View in the Light of Torcaso v. Watkins, 51
GEo. L.J. 252, 256-63, 269-76 (1963); Russell, Development of Conscientious Objector
Recognition in the United States, 20 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 409 (1952). The "exemption"
is strictly from combatant military service, not from service entirely, and for this reason
the Selective Service System considers the exemption to be only the allowance of an
"alternative form of service." There are two kinds of service available to the objector;
noncombatant service in the armed forces for those who are opposed only to the bearing
of arms, 32 C.F.R. § 1622.11 (1962), and civilian work of national importance, primarily
hospital and social welfare work, for those who are opposed to any participation in
military service, 32 C.F.R. § 1622.14 (1962).
2 293 U.S. 245, 266-68 (1934) (Cardozo, J., concurring) (classes in military science requiring
the bearing of arms even though contrary to religious belief may be made compulsory at
a state university).
3 283 U.S. 605, 624 (1931) (conscientious objector may not become a naturalized citizen
because the required oath exacts a promise to bear arms). This case was overruled by
Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946), on the grounds that the earlier case made
an erroneous statutory construction. The extraordinary procedure of disturbing a settled
statutory construction, see LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL RFASONING 32-33 (1948), hints
of constitutional considerations, and weakens the force of the constitutional dicta in
Macintosh, dicta heavily relied on in Hamilton.
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Selective Draft Law Cases,4 stated that the exemption may be re-
voked at will, or not granted at all, because it is only a privilege
extended by Congress in the exercise of its plenary war powers.
Congress, 5 lower federal courts, 6 and the Selective Service System 7
have echoed this doctrine. With some variation, it has also been
followed by almost all of the commentators.8 However, the validity of
the "privilege" argument, based on cases decided more than three
decades ago, is questionable in light of the Court's more recent de-
cisions9 construing the religion clauses.10 Therefore it is timely to
reexamine the constitutional status of the conscientious objector ex-
emption. To this end two questions will be considered by this com-
ment. First, is an exemption for conscientious objectors required by the
religion clauses of the first amendment?" Second, if the exemption
is constitutionally compelled, what is its necessary scope?
4 245 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1918) (World War I draft law does not violate either establish-
ment or free exercise clause.)
5 S. REP. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1948).
6 E.g., United States v. Bendik, 220 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1955); United States v. Kime, 188
F.2d 677, 678 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 947 (1950); Richter v. United States, 181
F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950); United States v. Kenstler, 250 F.
Supp. 833, 834 (W.D. Penn. 1966).
7 U.S. SELECTIVE SERvxcE SYSTEM, LEGAL AsPrars OF SELEciE SERvIcE 8 (1963); 2 U.S.
SLEcrIvE SERvICE SYsTEM, THE SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT 407 (Special Monograph No. 2, 1954).
8 See, e.g., DRINAN, RELIGION, THE COUiTS AND PUBLIC POLICY 15-20 (1963); KATZ,
RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 20-21 (1964); KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAm
37-38 (1962) (exemption of questionable constitutionality); PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE ANr
FREEDOM 505 (1953); Clancy & Weiss, Conscientious Objector Exemption: Problems in
Conceptual Clarity and Constitutional Considerations, 17 ME. L. REV. 143, 159 n.85 (1965);
Conklin, supra note 1, at 280 (exemption unconstitutional); Rabin, When Is a Religious
Belief Religious: United States v. Seeger and the Scope of Free Exercise, 51 CORNELL L.Q.
231, 241 n.59 (1966); Comment, The Conscientious Objector Exemption: Still Unsettled, 33
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1108, 1118-23 (1965); Comment, The Three Eras of the Conscientious
Objector, 34 U. CINc. L. REv. 487, 496 (1965). But see Brodie & Southerland, Conscience,
the Constitution and the Conscientious Objector; The Riddle of United States v. Seeger,
1966 Wis. L. REv. 306, 319-27; Freeman, Exemptions From Civil Responsibilities, 20 OHIO
ST. L.J. 437 (1959).
9 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203 (1963); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. 1 (1947), Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
For an excellent discussion of the "privilege" cases and an estimate of their current
strength as precedent, see generally Mansfield, Conscientious Objection-1964 Term, 1965
RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 1, 60-66.
10 "Congress shall make'no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof .... ." U.S. CoNsr. amend. L
11 For the purposes of this discussion it will be assumed that the scope of the exemp-
tion is settled law and includes all people who might properly be called religious
objectors.
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CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
THEORIES AND RESULTS
Four major theories of the religion clauses have been defended by
the commentators. Three closely related theories-neutrality, accom-
modation, and separation-have received explicit support in expres-
sions from the Court. These three differ primarily in the relative
weights they give to the two religion clauses. The neutrality theory
appears to give equal weight to the two clauses; 12 the accommodation
theory emphasizes the free exercise limitation on governmental inter-
ference with religious activity;' 3 and the separation theory emphasizes
the establishment clause limitation on governmental activity with re-
spect to religion.14 The fourth theory, whose chief proponent is Pro-
fessor Kurland, differs substantially from the other three. Kurland
suggests that the religion clauses must be read together, rather than
balanced, and that so read they prohibit all governmental action based
on any classification in terms of religion.15
A. The Neutrality Theory
Although the neutrality theory of the religion clauses has frequently
been espoused, if not followed, by the Court, it was not until the most
recent cases under the religion clauses, School District v. Schempp' 6
and Sherbert v. Verner,17 that the Court attempted to formulate a clear
standard for its application.' 8
In Schempp, while holding that Bible reading in the public schools
was an unconstitutional establishment of religion, Mr. Justice Clark
announced the Court's support of the principle of neutrality. He
began with the establishment clause:
[The Establishment Clause] withdrew all legislative power
12 See generally HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS (1965); KATZ, RELIGION AND
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS (1964).
13 See generally KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1964).
14 See generally PrEaM, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM (1953).
15 See generally KURLAND, REUIGION AND THE LAW (1962).
16 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
17 374 U.S. 398 (1963). While the Court didn't frame the issues in this case in terms of
the neutrality theory as it had done in Schempp, it is clear from the opinion that the
Court felt that it was operating under that theory. Id. at 409. Even the dissenters seem
to grant this point, for their complaint is that the majority follows the neutrality theory
too closely. Id. at 422.
18 In prior cases the Court apparently had great difficulty in devising standards for
the neutrality theory. See School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Kurland, The
School Prayer Cases, in THE WALL BErwEEN CHURCH AND STATE 143, 159-60 (Oaks ed.
1963).
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respecting religious belief or the expression thereof. The test
may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the pri-
mary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or
inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope
of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution.' 9
This test was derived from McGowan v. Maryland,20 where the validity
of a Sunday closing law was upheld because, although its purpose and
effect initially involved religion, the law's rationale had long since
changed; at the time the case was decided it was clear that the law
simply provided "a uniform day of rest for all citizens." 21 In Schempp,
however, the Court found that the purpose and effect of the state's
action in instituting Bible reading were to conduct a religious cere-
mony,22 an action clearly advancing purely religious interests. Most
of the other establishment clause cases, while apparently based on
different rationales, are consistent with McGowan and Schempp. For
example, in Everson v. Board of Education,3 which sustained reim-
bursement of transportation expense to parents of children at public,
private non-sectarian, and parochial schools, the primary purpose and
effect of the legislation was the promotion of the safety of the students
at these schools. 24
19 School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
20 366 U.S. 420, 442-44, 445 (1961); see Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
21 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445 (1961).
22 School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 (1963).
23 330 U.S. 1 (1947). This is the first case in which the Court spoke in terms of neu-
trality. Id. at 18.
24 The actual rationale for the decision was that the legislation was designed to benefit
the children attending these schools and not the religious schools themselves. Id. at 7, 14,
17, 18. This child benefit theory first appeared in Cochran v. Louisiana, 281 U.S. 370 (1930),
which dealt with the provision of textbooks on the same basis as the transportation in
Everson. Cochran was, however, decided under the due process clause, not under the
religion clauses.
Other examples of the Schempp purpose and effect rationale may be seen in Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (use of the New York Regent's Prayer violates the establish-
ment clause: purpose and effect of holding a religious ceremony); Torcaso v. Watkins,
367 U.S. 488 (1961) (Maryland constitutional provision requiring public officers to swear
to their belief in God invalid: effect, if not purpose, of excluding nontheists from public
office); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (released time
religious instruction violates the establishment clause; purpose and effect of encouraging
religious instruction). But see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (released time re-
ligious instruction off school property constitutional).
Everson and Torcaso are reasoned from a principle which forbids preference among
religions or between religion and non-religion. 330 U.S. at 15-16; 367 U.S. at 495. McCollum,
while following Everson, seems to rest on the state's use of the compulsory school at-
tendance mechanism to aid religious groups in spreading their faith. 333 U.S. at 208-11.
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With respect to the free exercise clause, however, Mr. Justice Clark's
statements in Schempp did not encompass the precedents quite as
neatly:
The Free Exercise Clause . . . withdraws from legislative
power... the exertion of any restraint on the free exercise of
religion. Its purpose is to secure religious liberty in the indi-
vidual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by the civil au-
thority. Hence it is necessary in a free exercise case for one to
show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against
him in the practice of his religion.25
Unfortunately this scheme of analysis based on an absolute prohibition
of all "coercive" restraints on free exercise did not last even as long as
the very next religion clause case, decided the same day as Schempp.
In Scherbert v. Verner28 South Carolina had denied unemployment
compensation to a claimant who, because she was a sabbatarian, would
not accept jobs necessitating Saturday work as required by state law in
order to qualify for compensation. The Court held that the denial
of compensation infringed the claimant's rights under the free exercise
clause. Although the state's rule forced the claimant to choose between
the unemployment compensation and one of the tenets of her faith,
a clear coercive restraint on her free exercise as delineated in
Schempp,27 the decision was not supported by reference to the Schempp
principle.28 Instead, the Court returned to the long line of free exercise
Engel, which cites no cases, seems to follow McCollum in finding the prayer part of a
program to further religious beliefs. 370 U.S. at 429-31.
25 School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963).
26 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
27 The difference in tone between the two opinions is partly accounted for by the
fact that the author of the Sherbert opinion was Mr. Justice Brennan, whose concurrence
in School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230-304 (1963), indicated that his idea of
neutrality was somewhat more latitudinarian than that of Mr. Justice Clark. See Kurland,
The School Prayer Cases, in THE WALL. BETWEEN CHURCH AN STATE 143, 163-68 (Oaks ed.
1963).
28 At least one reason why the principle was ignored was that some interference with
religious practice had been allowed by the Court in past cases. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599 (1960) (Sunday closing law may be applied to an Orthodox Jewish merchant);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (distribution of religious tracts may be
regulated under child labor laws); Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 293 U.S.
245 (1934) (classes in military science requiring the bearing of arms even when contrary
to religious beliefs may be made compulsory at a state university); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (bigamy statute may be applied to Mormon who finds it his
religious duty to practice polygamy).
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precedents in what may have been an attempt to formulate a more
workable statement of the free exercise portion of the neutrality the-
ory.
Drawing from these cases, the Court began with the distinction, first
enunciated in Reynolds v. United States,29 between religious belief
and religiously motivated action, and then it continued by distinguish-
ing direct and indirect burdens on free exercise, as was done in Braun-
feld v. Brown.30 Neither of these distinctions had been of much
help in solving problems under the free exercise clause in the
past, and their record was not improved by this application.31 The
reasons for their failure are numerous. While the distinction between
"action" and "belief" helps to explain some of the cases, 32 it does not
indicate what differentiates "action" from "belief," 33 nor does it define
29 98 U.S. 145 (1878). The defendant claimed that prosecution for bigamy was a
denial of free exercise to one who held the practice of polygamy a religious duty. While
stating that the imposition of any restraints on religious belief would be unconstitutional,
the Court denied the Mormon's claim and upheld this restraint on religiously motivated
action because the practice was "in violation of social duties or subversive of good order."
Id. at 164. See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) ("The conduct or actions
so regulated have invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or
order."); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) ("[T]he Amendment em-
braces two concepts,--freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but...
the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.').
30 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Pennsylvania's Sunday closing law does not deny the free exercise
of religion to an Orthodox Jewish merchant, who by reason of his religious beliefs could
not open his shop on Saturday, and would lose his livelihood if unable to operate on
Sunday). The Court stated that laws which outlaw religious practice impose a direct
burden on the individual and are usually invalid. All other laws which infringe on free
exercise are indirect burdens and may be sustained if they are shown to have a secular
purpose, "unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such
a burden." Id. at 607.
31 Were the Court to explain the interrelationship between the action-belief dichotomy
and the direct-indirect burden concept, perhaps some clarification of doctrine would
result. It may be suggested that the direct-indirect burden concept is an attempt at re-
categorization of those "actions" with which the government may interfere. It is not
clear, however, whether the resulting class of permissible limitations is identical to that
classification under the previous action-belief test, simply determined in a different
manner; or whether it is different. If different, it is still more unclear how and why it is
different.
32 See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (a state may not compel the
affirmation of a repugnant belief); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (the state
may not tax religious colporteurs so as to inhibit the dissemination of religious views);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (a state may not regulate solicitation in a way
which, through the method of determining what is a religious cause, tends toward censor-
ship of belief). Each may be viewed as an attempt at regulating belief. Permissible
regulations of action are Reynolds and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1943) (free
exercise no defense to a prosecution under child labor laws).
33 If the distribution of religious tracts is "belief" which may not be regulated in
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with precision the limits to action pursuant to religious belief.34
Furthermore, it does not explain the divergent results in Braunfeld and
Sherbert, decided only two years apart and analytically almost iden-
tical. 35 Nor can the direct and indirect burden distinction 8 ade-
quately distinguish these two cases.3
7
Murdock and Cantwell, why is it not still "belief" in Prince? The distinction is not based
on the Reynolds rationale; rather it is in the greater scope of state authority over children
than adults. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167, 170 (1944).
34 The threat to the social order is not the same from bigamy in Reynolds, child labor
in Prince, and unlicensed solicitation in Murdock; why is child labor more like bigamy
(action) than unlicensed solicitation (belief)? The results seem consistent, yet are by no
means indicated by the distinction between action and belief. A simple balancing of state
and individual interests would seem to be the best explanation of the standard applied
in these situations. Thus, the state has greater interest in maintaining social patterns
which it feels are conducive to a stable society by forbidding practices like bigamy and
child labor than it has in regulating the dissemination of religious views. The individual
has a greater interest in getting his views disseminated (Murdock) than in the manner
in which those views are disseminated (Prince). In these two cases strong and weak
interests are paired. Assuming the extremely debilitating effect of permitting two forms
of marriage to exist in one society, as the Court in Reynolds did, the state interest in
maintaining a stable society is greater than the strong individual interest in pursuing
the form of marriage he wishes.
35 The choice presented to the plaintiff in both cases was economic loss or abandon-
ment of religious practice. In both cases the Court found that religious belief, as opposed
to action, was not impaired by the state's regulation and in neither was it willing to
justify the state's statute on the grounds that it was a permissible regulation of religious
action. They may perhaps be tenuously distinguished on the ground that the economic
loss in Braunfeld was brought about through competition, while that in Sherbert was
brought about through the withholding of a governmental subsidy, a competetive loss in
only a very attenuated sense.
36 Exactly what is a "religious practice," seemingly crucial to the direct-indirect burden
analysis, is nowhere stated. The term seems limitless, and has even been held to include
snake handling, Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942), and the
consumption of peyote, People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69
(1964). Moreover, why the distinction turns on "religious practice" is not self-evident.
"Religious practice" seems to be a rather arbitrary division obscuring a continuum of
increasingly serious interferences with action taken pursuant to religious belief. As Sherbert
indicates, the whole distinction between direct and indirect burdens seems only to
further hide the factors motivating the Court; much of the difference between the
majority and dissent in that case can be explained by observing that the dissent clearly
characterized the burden as an- indirect one, 374 U.S. at 421, while the majority was
unclear on this point. Id. at 403-04.
Another difficulty is the lack of clarity to the concept of "available alternative." Ap-
parently it means another mode of regulation which accomplishes the desired end without
abandoning the whole legislative program. In most cases this alternative would be the
granting of an exemption from the law for those whose free exercise is infringed, but
it might also include a complete restructuring of the regulatory scheme.
37 Braunfeld found that there were no alternatives available which would accomplish the
state's regulatory purpose. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 US. 599, 608 (1961). The possible
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The doctrinal confusion aside, however, Sherbert appears to be
an attempt by the Court to formulate a more stringent standard
than that of Braunfeld by which to test the validity of legislation
under the free exercise clause in the light of the neutrality the-
ory.3 8 This standard may be formulated as follows: When general
regulatory legislation with a secular purpose has the effect of in-
fringing on the free exercise of religion, the state must adopt an
alternative form of regulation which eliminates this infringement,
unless it can demonstrate that no alternative form of regulation can
accomplish the legislative purpose without entailing unreasonable
costs. This standard would require that the regulatory scheme be in-
jured by the granting of the religious exemption before the denial of
that exemption would be sustained,39 on the ground that to avoid the
appearance of hostility to religion, the state should have no practical
alternative to the denial of the exemption.
Sherbert appears to be the controlling expression of the meaning of
the free exercise clause under the neutrality theory. Two observations
support this assertion.40 First, there is at least some tension between
alternative was the granting of an exemption from the law by allowing sabbatarians to
make Sunday sales, as was done in sixty percent of the states which had Sunday laws. Id.
at 614. Sherbert, following the same line of reasoning as Braunfeld, found that granting
the exemption was not only an available alternative, but a constitutionally compelled
one.
For varying views on the relationship of Braunfeld and Sherbert, compare Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1963) (Brennan, J.), with id. at 417-18 (Stewart, J., con-
curring) and id. at 421 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Douglas maintains that
Sherbert overruled Braunfeld. See Solomon v. South Carolina, 382 U.S. 204 (1965).
38 The Court made an attempt to distinguish Braunfeld on its facts on the ground
that there the burden was less direct, the state interest greater, and the administrative
difficulties insurmountable. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 899, 408 (1963). All this is un-
persuasive. In the two cases the administrative difficulty which would be encountered by
granting the exemption was weighed under different standards, for in Braunfeld the
practice of other states in granting the exemption was unimportant, while in Sherbert it
was significant. Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 399, 407 n.7 (1963), with Braunfeld
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608 (1961). Further, degrees of directness and relative strengths of
state interests are at best difficult to isolate.
39 See Comment, Religious Accommodation Under Sherbert v. Verner: The Common
Sense of the Matter, 10 ViL.. L. REV. 337, 339 (1965). The difference in tone and emphasis
between the two cases can best be seen by noting that Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599,
608 (1961), seems to require that the claimant demonstrate the practicability of the
suggested alternative. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 898, 407 (1963), seems to shift the
burden of persuasion when it states: "[I]t would plainly be incumbent upon . . .
[the state] to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such
abuses [as granting the exemption would engender] without infringing on First Amend-
ment rights."
40 It may be significant in this context that Mr. Justice Brennan appears still to adhere
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the result in Sherbert, requiring a religious exemption, and the estab-
lishment clause doctrine of Schempp, forbidding actions taken for
the purpose of the advancement of religion, for the required exemp-
tion seems to have the purpose of aiding the claimant in the practice
of her religion.41 This tension would not have been present had the
Court in Sherbert followed Braunfeld and denied the exemption. De-
spite this difficulty, and the recency of Braunfeld, the Court chose not
to follow Braunfeld. Second, in the most recent free exercise case, In
re Jenison,42 the Court chose to rest its decision on Sherbert, rather
than Braunfeld, even though both precedents seemed equally per-
suasive.
Combining Sherbert and the establishment clause cases such as
Everson and Schempp, the operative principle under the neutrality
theory may be derived. It is perhaps best stated as: "No help, unless
no help is harm."4 3 That is, while government may neither prefer one
religion over another, nor all religions generally, it may not be ob-
livious to the effects of governmental regulations on religiously moti-
vated activity. Therefore, in order that neutrality not become hostility,
governmental action will be required whenever possible to mini-
mize the effect of regulation on a citizen's religious activity. In
Schempp, considerations under the establishment clause forbidding
preferences controlled, because even with an exemption for the chil-
dren who did not wish to participate, the state could not insulate an
obvious preference for, and espousal of, religion. In Sherbert, on
the other hand, the ease of eliminating the burden imposed by the
to his dissent in Braunfeld, though he wrote the opinion of the Court in Sherbert. See
Solomon v. South Carolina, 382 U.S. 204 (1965).
41 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 413-17 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 422-23
(Harlan, J., dissenting). The Sherbert majority unconvincingly denies any inconsistency
between the decisions by saying that its decision "does not represent that involvement of
religious with secular institutions which it is the object of the Establishment Clause to
forestall." Id. at 409. Schempp, however, did not involve a religious institution, but a re-
ligious practice. The tension is further emphasized in the Court's later statement that it
was reaffirming the proposition that a state may not exclude individuals from the
benefits of welfare legislation "because of their faith or lack of it." Id. at 410 (quoting
from Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)). South Carolina was not
excluding the claimant because of her religion.
42 375 U.S. 14 (1963). In a per curiam decision the Court vacated and remanded, for
reconsideration in the light of Sherbert, a contempt conviction for refusal, on religious
grounds, to serve on a jury. Jenison is both a stronger-no monetary cost to the state-
and a weaker-a penal sanction-case than Sherbert for departing from the Braunfeld
precedent.
43 Gorman, A Case of Distributive Justice, in RELIGION AND THE SCHooLS 34, 60 (Fund
for the Republic 1959).
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regulation on the citizen's religious action was such that under the free
exercise clause any refusal to eliminate that burden would express the
equally forbidden hostility to some religions. Thus the two cases seem
to reflect, if not express, the same principle of neutrality.
Were the Court to adopt the principle of neutrality in its approach
to the constitutional claim of the conscientious objector, it would hold
that an exemption is required by the first amendment.44 If the religious
objector were denied the exemption, a burden would be imposed on
his free exercise of religion by forcing him to act contrary to his
religious beliefs. 45 To decide whether this is an impermissible burden
the neutrality theory begins with the concept of "no help," which
would seem to indicate that no exemption should be granted because
such an exeniption would aid religion by preferring the religious basis
for objection to war over other possible bases for objection. The neu-
trality theory, however, also requires that the conscientious objector
exemption be considered under the concept "unless no help would be
harm," which would require that this burden be eliminated if there is
an available alternative form of regulation.
That the denial of an exemption is not essential to the maintenance
of an effective military establishment is indicated in part by the fact
that Congress has always exempted the conscientious objector without
apparent detriment. The number of conscientious objectors is insig-
nificant-0.065 percent of all registrants. 46 Even more important,
statistics show that the percentage of conscientious objector exemp-
tions granted has remained relatively constant since 1948-unaffected
by either the Korean or the present Vietnamese war.47 This is con-
44 This comment has avoided the historical problems posed by the first amendment as
well as the question whether the first amendment was intended to protect conscientious
objection. See Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 806, 808-13
(1958). HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNEss 1-31 (1965), seems, however, to overstate
his case when insisting on the relevance of the historical meaning of the clauses for the
solution of contemporary problems, for "in the end the Supreme Court is free to give this
language the meaning that it chooses.. . in accommodating constitutional interpretation
to the felt needs of the day." KAuPER, REIGION AND THE CONSTIUTION 47 (1964). But see
Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. RFnv. 119-32, 137-42.
45 There would seem to be little question that this is a burden on free exercise. Part of
the practice of these people's religion requires them to refrain from killing even in time
of war, a requirement like the distribution of tracts in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105 (1943), or the observance of dietary restrictions. A schema for analysis of these
problems is vaguely set out in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1963).
46 20,200/32,640,000 (June 30, 1966). Letter and statistics from Kenneth H. McGill,
Chief, Research and Statistics Division, Selective Service System, to the University of
Chicago Law Review, April 6, 1966, on file in the Review office.
47 Ibid. There have been slight declines at the end of the Korean War, 1952-53, and,
curiously, in 1963.
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sistent with our experience in both World Wars, where the war effort
was not impaired by the conscientious objector exemption.48 Even
under the recently broadened exemption it is unlikely that there will
be a great rush of claimants. 49 Furthermore, experience with non-
exempt conscientious objectors indicates that their presence in the
armed services, or in jail, could be a greater detriment to a war
effort than any manpower advantage gained through their con-
scription. These men will not fight, 50 and it takes men to guard them
in prison; men who could otherwise be fighting.5x Arguments against
the exemption based on the difficulty of determining sincerity of be-
lief8 2 are undermined by both the British experience with an exemp-
tion broader than our own,53 and the past success in administering our
own law. 4 Moreover, Sherbert suggests that the simple assertion of the
possibility that spurious claims might be made under the exemption is
not a sufficient argument to deny the exemption; actual harm must be
shown to result from granting the exemption, 5 and past experience
indicates that such a showing could not be made.
All of these considerations indicate that granting the exemption for
48 During World War I the number of claimants was 2.3% (64,700) of those inducted
(2,810,000); only 2.0% (56,000) however, received the exemption, which gave only non-
combatant status. Of these men only 0.74% (20,800) were inducted and only 0.12%
(4,000) continued their claims once in camp. No figures are available for the total number
of registrants. SErmivE SERVICE SYsrE, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 53 (Special Monograph
No. 11, 1950).
In World War 11, under a considerably broadened exemption, the number of claimants
was 0.55% (72,000) of those inducted (13,000,000), but only 0.40% (52,000) received the
exemption. Registration was 34,000,000. Id. at 314-15.
49 See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965); notes 100-10 infra and accom-
panying text. The percentage of exemptions granted has undergone no perceptible change
since this decision was handed down in March, 1965. Letter from Kenneth H. McGill,
supra note 46.
50 Of the 15,758 people convicted of violation of the selective service laws during
World War II, 6,086 were conscientious objectors, 4,411 of whom were Jehovah's Witnesses.
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 263 (Special Monograph No. 11, 1950).
81 Cf. CENTRAL COMMITTEE FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS, HANDBOOK FOR CONSCIEN-
Tious OBJECTORS 85-88 (1953); SELECTIVE SaVICE SYSTEM, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 255-57
(Special Monograph No. 11, 1950).
52 Cf. Smith and Bell, The Conscientious Objector Program: A Search for Sincerity, 19
U. PIT. L. REv. 695 (1958).
53 The exemption was granted to all conscientious objectors regardless of the basis of
their belief. National Service Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 64 § 17. See HAYES, THE
CHALLENGE OF CONSCIENCE (1949); SILEY & JACOB, CONSCRIPTION OF CONSCIENCE 2-7 (1952).
The exemption was extended to certain limited classes of partly political objectors. HAYES,
op. cit. supra, at 52-64. During the war there were 61,000 claims made, 43,000 granted.
Registration was 8,123,000. ld. at 382-83.
54 SELECTrIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 338 (Special Monograph No. 11,
1950).
55 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
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the religiously motivated objector will not impair the defense effort.
Granting the exemption is a viable alternative form of regulation, and
thus, under the neutrality theory, constitutionally required.
B. The Accommodation Theory
The accommodation theory of the meaning of the first amendment
emphasizes the free exercise clause and narrowly restricts the establish-
ment clause. Its proponents argue that chaplains, governmental mottos,
draft exemptions, and religious property exemptions are constitution-
ally permissible instances of cooperation between church and state
in the United States.56 Most important to them, however, is Zorach v.
Clauson,57 the one Supreme Court case which may be said to have
adopted this theory with its famous dictum: "We are a religious people
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."5 s
In Zorach the Court upheld a program of released time religious in-
struction much like the program invalidated four years earlier as a
violation of the establishment clause in McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion.• 9 Unlike McCollum, however, the instruction was not given on
school property; rather the participating children were released early
from school to go to their church for classes. While the McCollum
opinion gave no indication that such an alteration in the program
would be of any significance, 60 it turned out to be determinative in
Zorach:
When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates
with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public
events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our tradition.
For it then respects the religious nature of our people and
accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. 61
The case has been distinguished from McCollum in every possible
way, but never limited or overruled.62 It seems to deviate in tone and
approach from the other establishment clause cases. 63 Thus its force
56 See generally DRINAN, RELIGION, THE COURTS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1963); KAuFER,
RELIGION AND THE CoNsTITUTIoN (1964).
57 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
58 Id. at 313.
59 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
60 The case seemed to rest on the state's use of the compulsory school attendance
mechanism for the benefit of religious groups. Id. at 209. See note 24 supra.
61 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952).
62 See, e.g., School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223, 261-62 (1963), Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 494 (1961).
63 See KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAw 88-90 (1963).
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as precedent is difficult to determine, though it may be significant that
McGowan,64 which also rejected an establishment claim, nowhere re-
lied on Zorach. Yet its thesis is not inconsistent with the results in
cases like Sherbert and Murdock v. Pennsylvania,6 5 which may be read
as requiring accommodations in programs of governmental regulation
to minimize interference with religious practice.66
The accommodation theory is based on the notion that the religion
clauses are essentially directed at the protection of religious liberty.6 7
Therefore, the government must provide a healthy atmosphere for the
growth of religion and religious influences on life by allowing a broad
scope of constitutionally protected religious activity. To accomplish
this end the establishment clause must be read narrowly to forbid only
governmental preference among religions and extreme instances of
direct support.6s
Were the Court to adopt the accommodation theory in passing on
the constitutional claim of the conscientious objector, it is certain that
the claim would be upheld, as the force of the establishment clause
limitation would be minimized. Under the doctrine of Zorach and the
logic of Sherbert, the government would be required to accommodate
the needs of national defense to the religious needs of its people, and
provide an exemption for the conscientious objector. This result is
strengthened by the facts shown earlier69 which indicate that granting
the exemption has a negligible effect on the maintenance of national
defense.
C. The Separation Theory
The separation theory of the meaning of the religion clauses is the
opposite of the accommodation theory, for it emphasizes the establish-
ment clause and tends to limit the free exercise clause. It has probably
never commanded a majority of the Court.
64 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); see text accompanying notes 20-21 supra.
65 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (solicitation license tax invalid as applied to distributors of
religious tracts).
66 This is how Mr. Justice Stewart, the current defender of the accommodation theory
on the Court, views them. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 415-16 (1963); School District
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 312-13, 317 (1963).
67 Some of the more extreme versions of the accommodation theory hold that part of the
idea of religious liberty is toleration by the minority of the non-coercive practices instituted
by the majority. Griswold, Absolute Is in the Dark: A Discussion of the Approach of the
Supreme Court to Constitutional Questions, 8 UTAm L. RFv. 167 (1963).
68 For example, such support might take the form of payments for the furtherance of
purely religious purposes such as guaranteeing loans on church buildings or providing
money for the purchase of hymnals.
69 See text accompanying notes 46-54 supra.
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The dissent of Mr. Justice Rutledge in Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion,70 the school transportation payments case, is the most famous
judicial statement of the theory. There he declared: "The great con-
dition of religious liberty is that it be maintained free from sustenance,
as also from other interferences, by the state. ' 71 Thus the establishment
clause "forbids state support, financial or other, of religion in any
guise, form or degree. It outlaws all use of public funds for religious
purposes." 72
While the adherents of the separation theory agree that this is the
meaning of the establishment clause, they differ as to the meaning of
the free exercise clause, so that two distinct separation theories may
be isolated. These two theories emerge most clearly through a com-
parison of the positions taken by the Everson dissenters in the earlier
decision of Murdock v. Pennsylvania.73 There the Court granted an
exemption for religious solicitation from a general solicitation license
tax. Mr. Justice Rutledge joined in the Court's opinion, which stressed
that the tax was a burden on the constitutional right of free exercise of
religion, and denied that the decision created a subsidy of religion
forbidden by the establishment clause.74 However, Justices Frankfurter
and Jackson argued that separation required a different result, and
dissented here also. They reasoned that by granting the exemption the
Court sanctioned a forbidden subsidy of religion by relieving a citizen
from the burden of a general tax solely because of his religious be-
liefs.75 Justice Rutledge's position produces a separation theory which
would prohibit governmental spending, the benefit of which inures to
any religious organization; it likewise would prohibit interference with
the religiously motivated action of an individual.76 On the other hand,
70 330 U.S. 1, 28 (1947). Justices Frankfurter, Jackson and Burton joined in the opinion.
71 Id. at 53.
72 Id. at 33.
73 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (Douglas, J.). See Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 578
(1944) (Douglas, J.) (a similar situation and result as in Murdock except that the appellant
this time earned his living selling these religious tracts).
74 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943). See Follett v. Town of McCormick,
321 U.S. 573, 577-78 (1944).
75 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 135, 139-40 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.). See Follett
v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 580-81, 583 (1944) (separate opinion of Roberts,
Frankfurter, and Jackson, JJ.). Mr. Justice Burton, the fourth dissenter in Everson, was
not on the Court when Follett or Murdock were decided.
The issue separating these two versions of the separation theory is explored, though
not joined, by the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Murphy and the dissenting opinions
of Justices Roberts, Frankfurter, and Jackson in Follett v. Town of McCormick, 821 U.S.
573, 578-79, 579-83 (1944). The difference appears to be solely whether exemptions offend
the establishment clause to the extent that direct payments do.
76 This is the position of Mr. Justice Douglas today. See generally his opinions in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (concurring); School District v. Schempp, 374
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the position of Justices Frankfurter and Jackson produces a separation
theory which would prohibit governmental support of religion, as well
as the granting of special considerations to the religious citizen37
Were the Court to follow the Rutledge interpretation of the separa-
tion theory, it is fairly apparent that the constitutional claim of the
conscientious objector would be upheld. Mr. Justice Douglas, the cur-
rent proponent of this theory on the Court, suggested that this was
the proper result in his concurrence in United States v. Seeger,78 a
recent case which construed the present statutory exemption. There
he adverted to a possible violation of the free exercise clause were the
Court to deny the claimant an exemption,7 9 and cited Sherbert as the
applicable precedent.5 0 His reasoning seems to be that since the exemp-
tion neither requires the expenditure of government funds, nor results
in promoting religion through official sanction in the manner of
Schempp, the exemption must be granted as in Murdock and Sherbert
to keep from interfering with free exercise."' It is equally apparent
that the Frankfurter-Jackson approach would deny the conscientious
objector's claim, for this position allows no constitutionally compelled
religious exemptions in general legislation.
D. The Kurland Theory
As the previous discussion indicates, the various theories of the re-
ligion clauses all suffer from a fragmented approach which makes it
difficult to state a coherent doctrine. Professor Kurland has sought to
remedy this difficulty and to state a unifying principle:
U.S. 203, 227 (1963) (concurring); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 437 (1962) (concurring);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 561 (1961) (dissenting). He has indicated that he now
feels that his vote with the majority in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) was
wrong. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443-44 (1962). He wrote the opinions in Follett and
Murdock. His majority opinion in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) is not inconsistent
with his position in these cases.
The difference between his version of the separation theory and the neutrality theory is
that he finds that there can never be a secular purpose to expenditures which inure to
the benefit of religious institutions, while the neutrality theory recognizes that some such
expenditures, for example the bus transportation in Everson, can have a secular purpose.
77 No member of the current Court apparently holds this position. The only possible
candidates would be Justices Harlan and White, the dissenters in Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 898 (1963). Their dissent in that case, as well as their votes in Schempp, indicate
that they adhere to variants of other theories of the religion clauses.
78 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
79 Id. at 188.
80 He dissented in the case of Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), in an opinion
accompanying McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 561 (1962).
81 But see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (religious duty no defense to child
labor law violation) (Opinion by Rutledge, J., joined by Douglas, J.). This vote is dearly
out of line with his position today.
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[T]he proper construction of the religion clauses of the first
amendment is that the freedom and separation clauses should
be read together as a single precept that government cannot
utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because
these clauses prohibit classification in terms of religion either
to confer a benefit or to impose a burden.8 2
This suggestion has not received universal acclaim. 3 Some of the mem-
bers of the Court have commented on it, but none have accepted it. 8 4
In fact, all the Justices may be said to have rejected this thesis in
Sherbert v. Verner,s 5 for the result of that case required that a bene-
fit-unemployment compensation-be extended to the claimant on
the basis of a religious classification.
Professor Kurland's theory has some support in the cases, especially
Everson, McCollum, and Torcaso v. Watkins.8 These establishment
clause cases have led two commentators to maintain that the conscien-
tious objector exemption, at least as currently written, is unconstitu-
tional.8 7 Professor Kurland indicates that he would agree with this
analysis but for the possibility of the continued vitality of the Selective
Draft Law Cases,"$ which sustained the conscientious objector exemp-
tion from attack on establishment grounds. These cases he implies were
82 KUaLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAw 18 (1962). The Frankfurter-Jackson version of the
separation theory may be identical to the theory of Professor Kurland. Whether this is
so depends on their decision in a type of case they never had a chance to decide; the
state-granted exemption such as the religious property tax exemption. The Kurland
theory would find this unconstitutional, assuming that the exemption did not extend to
all eleemosynary bodies; it is not clear what Mr. Justice Frankfurter would have done.
See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 520-22 (1961); McCollum v. Board of Education,
333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948). But cf. Heisey v. County of Alameda, 352 U.S. 921 (1956) (dissent
from per curiam dismissal for want of substantial federal question of a religious tax
exemption case).
83 See, e.g., Pfeffer, Religion Blind Government, 15 STAN. L. Rav. 389 (1963); Kauper,
Book Review, 41 TExAs L. REv. 467 (1963).
84 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); School District
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296 n.70 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
85 374 U.S. 398 (1963). While the result which the dissenters advocate, denial of the
exemption, is consistent with the Kurland thesis, they explicitly reject that thesis. Id. at 422.
86 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (state constitutional requirement that public officers swear to the
belief in the existence of God invalid). It is clear, however, that the author of these
opinions, Mr. Justice Black, would not extend their rationale to the free exercise clause
as would Professor Kurland. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); where Mr. Justice Black voted to grant exemptions
dearly forbidden by the Kurland theory on free exercise grounds.
87 Donnici, Government Encouragement of Religious Ideology: A Study of the Current
Conscientious Objector Exemptions From Military Service, 13 J. PuB. L. 16 (1964);
Conklin, Conscientious Objector Provisions: A View in the Light of Torcaso v. Watkins,
51 GEo. L.J. 252 (1963).
88 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
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wrongly decided.89 Under the Kurland theory, if the conscientious
objector is to have his beliefs respected, the draft must either be aban-
doned and service be made voluntary, or a rational classification must
be found which includes the objector without being based on a re-
ligious standard. Thus, application of the Kurland theory by the Court
would lead to the rejection of the conscientious objector's claim under
the free exercise clause.
This attempt to explore the various major theories of the religion
clauses has demonstrated that the neutrality, accommodation, and Rut-
ledge version of separation theories support a constitutional claim to
the conscientious objector exemption. The Frankfurter-Jackson and
Kurland theories do not. Which one the Court will adopt, if it meets
the question, is unclear. However, the voting records, as well as the
theories articulated by a majority of the current Court, indicate that
the exemption would be constitutionally required.90
THE SCOPE OF THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR EXEMPTION
In attempting to establish that the conscientious objector exemption
is constitutionally required, it has been assumed that the scope of the
exemption is settled law and includes all people who might properly be
called religious objectors. In view of the general uncertainty in the law
of the religion clauses, this assumption warrants examination. Such ex-
amination indicates the extreme difficulty of determining the current
constitutional definition of religion,91 as well as whether an exemption
which extends only to the religious objector is constitutionally suffi-
cient.92 It also casts some light on the instability and latent internal
inconsistency observable in all of the theories of the religion clauses.
When the religion clauses are viewed separately, the conceptual con-
89 Kua. AND, RELICION AND THE LAw 40-41 (1962).
90 See notes 66, 76, & 77, and text accompanying note 85 supra. Justices Harlan and
White might even switch their votes if they felt Sherbert was a sufficiently strong precedent,
and felt bound by it.
91 For an attempt at this task see Comment, Defining Religion: Of God, the Constitu-
tion, and the D.A.R., 32 U. Cm. L. R v. 533 (1965).
92 While this comment will deal with the question of the necessary scope of the
conscientious objector exemption under the assumption that the exemption is constitu-
tionally required by the free exercise clause, the need for this inquiry arises regardless of
whether the exemption is constitutionally required. Under the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions an exemption which was only a matter of legislative grace could not be granted
arbitrarily but would still be subject to the applicable constitutional requirements. See
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Bolling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); American Com-
munications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 417 (1950) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.); French,
Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis, 50 GEo. L.J. 234 (1961); Comment, Unconstitu-
tional Conditions, 73 HARv. L. Rav. 1595 (1960). Among these requirements would be the
standards of the religion clauses.
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flict between them, on which Mr. Justice Stewart commented in
Sherbert,93 becomes apparent. The majority opinion in Schempp,94
resting on the purpose and effect of the law in question, may be
viewed as a restatement of the doctrine of Everson95 and Torcaso,96
which is that the establishment clause forbids governmental pref-
erence, both as to benefits and burdens, either among believers-
theist and nontheist alike-or between believers and nonbelievers.97
Under this interpretation of the establishment clause, the conscientious
objector exemption may not be granted on a religious standard, for to
do so would be to prefer believers over nonbelievers. However, the free
exercise cases, especially Sherbert9" and Murdock,99 may be read to
require special privileges and exemptions for the religious person-
specifically the conscientious objector exemption. Thus follows the
curious result that an exemption for the religious objector seems to be
prohibited by the establishment clause and at the same time required
by the free exercise clause.
93 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 414, 416 (1963). See also School District v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 309 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Harlan also noted the conflict
in his dissent in Sherbert. 374 U.S. at 422-23. The majority of the Court, however, will
not admit that its reading of the clauses results in a conflict; at the most the clauses "over-
lap." See School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,
430 (1962).
94 School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); see text accompanying notes 19 & 25
supra.
95 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947); see note 23 supra and accompany-
ing text.
96 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1962); see note 24 supra.
97 "Neither [a state nor the federal government) can constitutionally pass laws or
impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers and neither can aid
those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded
on different beliefs." Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 498 (1961). Thus, the purpose and
effect language of Schempp and McGowan is disregarded. See text accompanying notes
19-24 supra. The result appears to be much like the theory of Professor Kurland, except
that contrary to his approach the principle is applied only to the establishment clause.
It is apparent from the above language that there are three groups of people about whom
the Court is concerned in religion clause cases-the theists, believing in the existence of
God; the nontheists, believing in some ultimate, but not in the existence of God; and the
nonbelievers, at least the atheists, adherents to various philosophical systems, and thqse
with no system of beliefs. Exactly who falls in these groups is not dear however. This
comment has assumed that the Court considers all those people who fall within the rule of
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965) (quoted at note 110 infra), to com-
pletely fill the theist and nontheist categories, and that this grouping is coextensive with
the current constitutional meaning of "religion." But see Rabin, When Is a Religious Belief
Religious: United States v. Seeger and the Scope of Free Exercise, 51 COMELL L.Q. 231,
242-44 (1966); Comment, supra note 91, 32 U. CHi. L. Rxv. at 537 n.24 (1965).
98 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963); see text accompanying notes 26-30
supra.
99 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); see text accompanying notes 73-75
supra.
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An examination of the recent case of United States v. Seeger 0 0 helps
to illuminate the logical difficulty at the core of this conflict.
Seeger asserted "that his was a belief in and a devotion to goodness and
virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical
creed."''1 1 While admitting his sincerity, his draft board denied him a
conscientious objector exemption solely because his opposition was
not based upon a belief "in a relation to a Supreme Being" as required
by the statute. 02 As thus applied to Seeger, a nontheist,10 3 the statutory
language and intent seemed to violate both the establishment clause,
by preferring theists over nontheists,20 4 and the free exercise clause, by
denying the nontheists the free exercise of their religion. 0 5 The trial
court rejected these arguments and Seeger was convicted of refusing
to submit to induction.1 6 That conviction, however, was reversed on
appeal,107 and the Supreme Court affirmed. 08 But, by adopting a broad
construction of the "Supreme Being" clause,'0 9 the Court was able to
avoid all of the serious constitutional issues:
[T]he test of a belief "in a relation to a Supreme Being" is
whether a belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a
place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the
orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the
exemption. 110
100 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
101 United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 848 (2d Cir. 1964).
102 Universal Military Training and Service Act, 62 Stat. 613 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App.
§ 456(j) (1964).
103 Throughout the proceedings Seeger maintained that he was a religious objector.
Brief for Respondent, pp. 3-4, 21, 28-31, 41. The Government strongly denied this. Reply
Brief for the United States, pp. 1-3.
104 See United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 851-53 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v.
Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409, 414 (2d Cir. 1963).
105 See United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 852-53 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v.
Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409, 415 (2d Cir. 1963).
o6 United States v. Seeger, 216 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
107 United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964).
108 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
109 The construction adopted was supported by neither the text nor the legislative
history. See S. R.EP. 'No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1948); Comment, Conscientious
Objector Exemption: Still Unsettled, 33 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 1108 (1965); Comment, supra
note 91, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 533.
110 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66. This test was first stated in
Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 679, 315 P.2d 394,
406 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957). Just who is included and who is excluded under this formulation
is by no means dear. The rule is seemingly limitlessly expansive and could be said to
include a belief in personal survival as the ultimate good, a belief it is doubtful the
Court intended to encompass in the class of those people exempted. For a further ex-
ploration of the difficulties caused by the indeterminacy of the limits of the Seeger
test, see authorities cited note 115 infra.
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This careful work, of course, has not begun to solve the many consti-
tutional problems raised by an inquiry into the necessary scope of the
conscientious objector exemption. For example, granting the exemp-
tion only to the religious objector, and thus denying the exemption to
the sincere objector who disclaims any religious basis to his objection
and who thus has no claim under the free exercise clause, can be said
to violate the establishment clause by preferring all religious persons
over nonbelievers."' Yet, it has been assumed that the free exercise
clause requires this exemption for the religious objector. Thus, while
in the case of the religious objector, Seeger, the two clauses were both
violated and worked together to secure an exemption, with the non-
religious objector the clauses are not working harmoniously, but lead
to conflicting results. Since the only factor which has been changed in
the two situations is the status of the claimant, that must reflect the
cause of the conflict between the clauses.
The reason why the change in the status of the claimant results in
exposing the conflict is that the clauses vary as to the groups of people
which they protect. The free exercise clause as currently interpreted
considers governmental action only with respect to believers-non-
theists as well as theists.112 In contrast, the establishment clause as cur-
rently interpreted considers governmental action with respect to three
groups-the two groups of believers, and the nonbelievers as well." 3
Thus the necessity of adjusting state action with respect to the
111 See authorities cited note 87 supra.
112 See School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 603-06 (1961).
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1962) (Maryland Constitutional provision requiring
public officers to swear to their belief in God invalid), may indicate to the contrary, for the
Court was unclear as to whether it was deciding that case under the establishment clause or
the free exercise clause. The case is usually considered an establishment case. See School
District v. Schempp, supra, at 216, 220. But see DOUGLAs, THE BmiLE AND THE SCHOOIS
9 (1966). Except for the matter of appropriate remedy, it makes no difference which kind
of case it was as long as the Court considered the claimant to be one of the nontheists, for
then the case is just like Seeger. If, however, he was considered to be one of the non-
believers, and the case was decided on free exercise grounds, then the conflict may thus
have been eliminated through expansion of the free exercise clause to include nonbelievers.
See note 114 infra.
For a short discussion of the classification of "believers" and "nonbelievers" see note 97
supra. The Seeger opinion seems to accept this system of classification, although the
Court makes no attempt to give the terms any great degree of precision.
113 See Torcaso v. Watkins, 567 U.S. 488, 495 (1962); Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
There is a possible explanation for the difference in the scope of the two clauses other
than the fact that somehow the Court got started this way and has continued due to the
pressure of ways of thought generated by precedent; there would seem to be little reason
why a clause guaranteeing the free exercise of religion should include within its protection
those who by definition are nonreligious.
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third group-the nonbelievers-to satisfy the establishment clause
causes the conflict between the clauses.
Until this conflict is eliminated, it will be difficult to determine the
constitutionally necessary scope of the conscientious objector exemp-
tion.1 14 Whether it must, under the establishment clause, extend to the
nonreligious person is unclear, though Seeger indicates that at the least
the exemption must extend to all religious objectors. Yet, without even
considering the problems of the Seeger test,115 the conflict also makes
unclear who is the religious objector, since it casts doubt on the suffi-
ciency of the current case law on which such a definition would
necessarily be built.116
Recognition of this conflict also helps to explain both the impetus
for the formulation of the various theories of the religion clauses and
114 Several possible resolutions of the conflict between the clauses are open to the Court.
The scope of the establishment clause might be limited to forbidding preferences among
religions as Mr. Justice Stewart has suggested in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 415-16
(1963); this would leave the scope of the conscientious objector exemption as it is now.
Alternatively, the scope of the free exercise clause, and correspondingly the exemption,
may be expanded to include nonreligious beliefs. A third possibility derives from certain
language in Sherbert which indicates that the establishment clause limitations may not
operate when exemptions are granted in general regulatory programs on grounds of free
exercise. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963). In this case the exemption need
only cover the more narrowly religious objectors. The Court's treatment of the conflict in
Seeger suggests a fourth possibility; it may continue to ignore the conflict in which case
the exemption will extend to the unclear, indeterminate group delineated by the test in
that opinion-the theists, nontheists, and any chameleonic claimant who can appear suffi-
ciently like the others. Either of the last two choices seem the more probable, since the
scope of the establishment clause seems well established, and it is hard to maintain that
the protection of the free exercise clause, specifically given to the religious person, extends
to those who are by definition not religious.
Some of the commentators mysteriously believe that an explanation of the cases will make
the conflict disappear. See Moore, The Supreme Court and the Relationship Between the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, 42 TExAs L. REv. 142 (1963); Comment, The
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses: Coordination or Conflict?, 48 MiNN. L. Rzv.
929 (1964).
115 These problems are explored in Brodie 9: Southerland, Conscience, the Constitution
and the Supreme Court: The Riddle of United States v. Seeger, 1966 Wisc. L. R~v. 306,
316-19 (1966); Comment, Conscientious Objector Exemption: Still Unsettled, 33 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 1108 (1965); Note, 34 FORDHAM L. REv. 129 (1965); Note, 18 VND. L. REv.
1564 (1965).
116 It is at least possible that any definition of "religion" is constitutionally impermis-
sible as both an establishment, and a denial of free exercise to anyone mistakenly not
included. See Weiss, Privilege, Posture, and Protection: "Religion" in the Law, 73 YALE
L.J. 593, 604 (1964). Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940): "[I]o condition
the solicitation of aid for religion ... upon a license, the grant of which rests in the exercise
of a determination by a state authority as to what is a religious cause, is to lay a forbidden
burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by the Constitution." A strong case can also
be made for the inclusion of some of the nonbelievers within the concept of religion.
See Rabin, supra note 97, at 245-47.
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their failure as solutions to the conflict. 117 Each theory attempts to
avoid completely the difficulties created by the conflict through the use
of an overriding principle."" All except Professor Kurland's theory ac-
complish this by disregarding the different logical groupings covered
by the clauses, and thus only paper-over the problem created by the
scopes of the two clauses. 119
In the absence of a clear constitutional standard defining the neces-
sary scope of the conscientious objector exemption, the formulation of
an exemption which could bypass the constitutional difficulties would
seem to provide an acceptable political solution to the problem. It is
submitted that the current exemption should therefore be expanded
by Congress to include all persons who hold a sincere opposition to
participation in war without regard to religious belief.120
117 Admittedly, perception of the doctrinal conflict detracts from any conclusion that
an exemption is constitutionally required, since that conclusion is based on theories
whose soundness is challenged because they do not meet and deal with the conflict.
However, either of the solutions to the conflict which have been suggested as most likely to
be adopted by the Court, see note 114 supra, would not disturb the analysis used to
establish any constitutional requirement.
118 Cf. Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. Cm. L. REv. 426, 428
(1953); Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 MICH. L. REv. 1031,
1054 (1963).
119 The neutrality theory conveniently forgets that "no help" may well be "harm,"
as well as that exemptions granted because of "actual harm" are indeed "help." Likewise,
the accommodation theory conveniently forgets that a prohibition of laws "respecting an
establishment of religion" is of a tenor contrary to the beneficient cooperation it en-
visions. The separation theory, on the other hand, forgets that real separation may require
the infringement of someone's free exercise. Yet Professor Kurland's theory ultimately
avoids the conflict also, for it simply rejects the case law which yields the problem.
120 Where any right under the free exercise clause has at least been tentatively established,
the approach to religion clause problems taken in this comment may, as a policy matter, be
an acceptable political solution, at least until the Court clears up religion clause doctrine
sufficiently to give better guidance than at the present. The technique is simple; if at all
possible the legislature should expand the claimed religious exemption to include others
similiarly situated without regard to religious belief. It must also be admitted, however,
that the possibility of Congress adopting the suggested solution in the case of the
conscientious objector is minimal in this wartime climate; adoption of the more general
solution is even more problematical.
It may be objected that in the case of the conscientious objector exemption the suggested
general approach is exactly the one which the Supreme Court followed in Seeger, and
that thus the solution advocated here has already been reached. See Rabin, supra note 97,
at 242-44, 247-48; Comment, supra note 91, 32 U. CHm. L. Rlv. at 550-54 (1965). This
argument is, however, questionable. Both the Court and Mr. Justice Douglas stated that
the case of an atheist is a different one which they did not decide. United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163, 174-75, 193 (1965). They also iterated that they were extending the exemption
only to religious objectors. Id. at 165, 173. But cf. Fleming v. United States, 344 F.2d 912 (10th
Cir. 1965), where the court read the statutory exclusion of "essentially political, sociological,
or philosophical views" narrowly, saying that it operates only when beliefs falling within it
are the only basis for the claimant's exemption. In this process the court was following
[Vol. 34:79
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Certain benefits may be derived from expanding the exemption.
Most important, the broadened exemption is free from constitutional
infirmities under any theory of the religion clauses. The scope of the
exemption easily includes the religious objector, as it must under the
neutrality, accommodation and Rutledge separation theories. More-
over, since the exemption results in neither support of religion as such
nor in the granting of special considerations to the religious citizen, it
does not offend the Frankfurter-Jackson analysis. Because it is a ra-
tional classification not in terms of religion, it satisfies Professor Kur-
land's standard.
Second, expansion of the exemption is consonant with the usual
analysis of the political problem posed by conscientious objection. Tra-
ditionally, two limits have been placed on dissent from the decision
to wage war: an individual must oppose participation in all wars and
the Supreme Court's similar treatment of the exclusion of "a merely personal moral code"
in Seeger.
It is conceivable that constitutional doctrine could be developed to secure the broader
exemption. There are two possible approaches: the due process clause, following the schema
of reasoning used in Seeger v. United States, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964), and relying heavily
on the psychological similarity between the beliefs of the religious and the nonreligious
objector (see authorities cited note 125 infra); or the first amendment generally, following
the approach of Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compulsory flag
salute in public schools unconstitutional), and relying on a concept of freedom of belief.
An extremely fine use of the constitutional scalpel could give the same result, and perhaps
avoid some of the political hassle. The Universal Military Training and Service Act, ch.
149, § 5, 65 Stat. 88 (1951), has separability provisions. By a highly selective use of these
provisions the Court could strike out the phrase "by reason of religious training and belief"
and the sentence defining it as being violations of the establishment clause in the hope
that Congress would not try to eliminate the remainder out of respect to the traditional
objectors.
One of the reasons for establishing a constitutional basis for the exemption would be
to protect it from congressional tampering as part of an attempt to silence dissent from
its policies in a situation when no crisis, which would otherwise justify the action, was
imminent. Such a threat is not unreal, as witnessed by the recent congressional response
to the draft card burning protests against the war in Viet Nam. The Act of August 30, 1965,
79 Stat. 586 (1965) makes criminal the "knowing destruction or knowing mutilation" of a
draft card, which crime is punishable by a five year prison sentence, or a $10,000 fine, or
both. An examination of the legislative history of the act, 111 CONG. REc. 19012, 19134-36
(daily ed. Aug. 10, 1965); H.R. REP. No. 747, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), indicates that
the congressional intent, if any, was to express its displeasure with the youthful opponents
of the war.
An argument against giving the broader exemption constitutional status based on a
supposed necessity to draw on the larger group of conscientious objectors in an extreme
crisis somewhat neglects the realities of the situation it envisions. It is questionable
whether, given the emergency suggested, there would be any functioning legal process
either to inhibit the abrogation of any exemption, even if constitutionally based, or to
enforce a revocation, to the extent the exemption might be a matter of legislative grace.
Thus the situation of extreme crisis is not that relevant to any balancing of interests in-
volved in determining constitutional status.
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his opposition must be religiously based. 12 1 These limitations on indi-
vidual dissent from political decisions are designed to preserve the gov-
ernment's political integrity by insuring that the individual is not
making the same type of political decisions as his government except
in the context of the political process maintained to resolve political
disagreements of members of that community. 22 Although it abandons
one of the traditional limits on dissent, the suggested exemption con-
tinues to provide for preservation of governmental political integrity
by retaining the limit more relevant to the political purpose of such
limits-the requirement that opposition be to participation in all wars.
This limit is the more relevant one because the decision to oppose a
particular war in contrast to war in general, is arrived at by reweighing
the same factors which impressed themselves on the government in
its original decision to wage a particular war.1 23 This is the very process
121 For extended discussions of the place of conscientious objection in political theory
see KELLOGG, THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR 121-26 (1919); LASKI, AUTHORITY IN THE MODERN
STATE 42-52 (1919); THOMAS, THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJEcTOR IN AmERICA 1-13 (1923); Dickin-
son, Social Order and Political Authority II, 23 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 593, 629-30 (1929);
Rudlin, Political Obedience, in 11 ENCYC. Soc. Sos. 415 (1933). See generally BosANQuET,
THE PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY OF THE STATE (1899); GREEN, LECTURES ON THE PRINCIPLES OF
POLITICAL OBLIGATION (1895); HOBHOUSE, THE METAPHYSICAL THEORY OF THE STATE (1918);
MIL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
122 This point reflects the pervasiveness of contract notions in political theory. The
social contract, like any contract, is one founded on the reasonable expectations of the
parties. It is reasonable for a nation state to require that its citizens refrain from making
decisions which reflect on its political integrity in the community of states in exchange
for some protection from the other members of that community. A somewhat less con-
servative version of social contract theory, more applicable to a democracy, would view
the contract as between the citizens of the state, whereby the quid pro quo for a stable
social and political community is respect for the integrity of the institutional democratic
process which arrives at the policy decisions that are being followed. Thus, each citizen
must give up his right to make these policy decisions individually in the interest of main-
taining the peaceful framework which any community needs to continue to exist as
such. This second theory can also be seen as a contract subsidiary to the one between the
state and the citizen regulating how state policy shall be determined. These rather simplis-
tic formulations of course must be modified still further in the United States to account for
such phenomena as supposedly inviolable minority rights and civil disobedience.
123 It may be objected that a decision by a nation not to oppose the waging of war is
the logical premise to a decision to wage any particular war, and that the objector is thus
still making the same political choice as the government. Except for the case of historic
neutrals such as Switzerland, it is doubtful whether the choice of whether or not to
wage any wars can seriously be said to have been squarely made by any nation, logically
necessary though it may be, at least in the way the decision to wage or not wage a par-
ticular war is made. The element of conscious choice would seem to be a sufficient dis-
tinction of the two kinds of decision respecting war generally for the purpose of this
discussion. Contract notions again explain this point well. It is the reasonable expectation
of the parties to this social contract that the nation state will in the course of time wage
some wars, so that the proffered logical premise does not represent a decision open to the
state but rather a basic assumption of the parties.
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which limits on dissent are designed to preclude. The religious limita-
tion does not serve the same primarily political function as the "war in
general" limitation. It is designed to ease the administration of the
law by providing additional evidence that an individual's decision is
not an essentially political one,124 and therefore may be more easily
eliminated without substantially affecting governmental integrity.
Third, expansion of the conscientious objector exemption would
result in a fairer draft law: essentially nonpolitical opposition to par-
ticipation in all wars may have many bases; it need not necessarily be
derived from a religious belief.125 Most, if not all, of the possible bases
for an objection to participation in all wars pose the same type of chal-
lenge to governmental authority. 26 A religiously based opposition to
war is extremely difficult to distinguish functionally from an objection
based on philosophical or ethical grounds. 27 This difficulty results in
the making of somewhat arbitrary distinctions along the exceedingly
hazy perimeter of the concept of religious belief. The Seeger case ac-
centuates the arbitrary marginal decisions through the additional
vagueness induced by the Court's attempt to be fairer than previously
to certain groups who are arguably religious. In view of the similarity
of the psychological function of the various bases for opposition to all
wars, it would seem desirable to extend the fairness rationale of Seeger
by eliminating the religious limitation on the conscientious objector
exemption.
The costs in terms of loss of manpower for the defense effort which
would be incurred by eliminating the religious limitation appear to be
low. First, the number of men who would be exempted would not be a
124 It may be suggested that in addition to deference to religious views and prejudice
against the nonreligious, the historical reason for the limitation is the fact that the
traditional religious objector's claim to be obeying the command of a non-temporal
sovereign provides necessary assurance to the temporal sovereign that his authority was
not challenged by granting the exemption.
125 See Boisen, The Conscientious Objectors, 7 PSYCHIATRY 215 (1944); Kelley & Johnson,
Emotional Traits in Pacifists, 28 J. SocIAL PsYcHoLoGY 275 (1948); Pescor, A Study of
Selective Service Violators, 105 AMEwcAN J. of PsYC HIATRY 641 (1949); Schmidt, Socio-
Psychological Inquiry Into the Nature of Conscientious Objectors as Personalities, June
1946 (unpublished thesis in University of Chicago Library); Shifrin, Personality Patterns
of Conscientious Objectors, March 1947 (unpublished thesis in University of Chicago
Library).
126 One kind of objector who might be thought to pose a greater challenge would be
the radical socialist pacifist who refuses to fight because war is a tool of the capitalists.
127 Clancy & Weiss, Conscientious Objector Exemptions: Problems in Conceptual Clarity
and Constitutional Considerations, 17 ME. L. REv. 143 (1965); Pescor, op. cit. supra note
125; Schmidt, op. cit. supra note 125. The real difficulty of this attempt may be seen from
the rather murky results of what is apparently an attempt at making this distinction.
Mansfield, Conscientious Objection-1964 Term, 1965 RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 1,
12-35.
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significant inroad on the potential manpower available.128 The num-
ber of objectors in Britain during World War II, under a similar
exemption, 129 was less than 0.5 percent of the number of registrants.130
This incidence of objection by no means crippled the British war
effort. It would be unlikely seriously to hamper an American effort
either. There would need to be an eight-fold increase in the rate of
objection in the United States before it even reached the British level;
it is hard to believe that there are this many nonreligious objectors
waiting for a chance to claim the exemption.' 31 Further, as part of the
statutory requirement that objectors perform some work of national
importance in lieu of military service, 132 objectors could be utilized in
civilian capacities, thereby freeing some men for service in the armed
forces. By not granting the nonreligious person the exemption, the
defense effort loses the manpower which would thus be freed.
Second, resting the decision to grant the exemption solely on the
determination of the claimant's sincerity should not impose a crippling
administrative burden on the Selective Service System, nor should it
result in recognizing a great number of fraudulent claims. The present
exemption requires a determination of the claimant's sincerity as well
as of the religious nature of his belief. The suggested exemption simpli-
fies the administrative task by eliminating the difficulty of separat-
ing out religious beliefs from the continuum of sincerely held beliefs
which may be the basis for conscientious objection. Instead it con-
centrates on making the single factual determination of sincerity which
draft boards have had much experience in making under the current
exemption. Their expertise will hopefully improve through focus on
this one factual issue. Admittedly, eliminating the religious limitation
128 See notes 46-49 supra and accompanying text.
129 National Service Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 64 § 17. Conscription is, however,
no longer in effect in Great Britain. National Service Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 64 § 61,
as amended, Stat. Instr., 1953, No. 1771 (liability ended for all born after Dec. 31, 1940).
The draft was ended in December 1960, Call up of Men to the Forces 195711960, CiMND.
No. 175, at 2 (1957), and National Service in December 1962, Statement of Minister of
Defense, 600 H.C. DEB. (5th ser.) 1142 (1959).
130 See HAYEs, THE CHALLENGE OF CONSCIENCE 382-83 (1949).
131 The popularity of a war as reflected by the extent of the national consensus as to the
correctness of the course pursued may have some effect on the rate of objection. In an
unpopular war the "marginal" objector should tend to claim an exemption more readily
than in a popular war in which the supposed moral force behind his country's position
may tend to negate some of the moral basis for objection. This tendency for increased
claims in unpopular wars should not result in a great many extra claims; if the war is so
unpopular that many such claims do arise, it might be better to question the adequacy of
the democratic process at that time rather than the desirability of the exemption.
132 62 Stat. 604, 50 U.S.C. App. § 4560) (1964).
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will cause stress to be put on this difficult determination of sincerity.
Thus the falsification of claims may increase due to the lack of the
check on the determination of sincerity which the religious limitation
provided. Yet even with the religious limitation some people surely
falsify claims now. Some of the current false claims and some of the
new attempts should be caught through the additional expertise gained
from narrowing the inquiry. More importantly, the claimant under
the broader exemption will continue to be required to present evi-
dence showing a long, or extremely convincing, record in support of his
claim. The extensive investigation which each claimant receives is an
effective further deterrent to spurious claims.133 An additional deter-
rent is found in the stigma still attached in American society to the
assertion of conscientious objection.134 Thus any increase in the falsi-
fication of claims should not be sufficient to require rejection of the
suggested exemption.
The benefits, in terms of clear constitutionality, consonance with
political theory, and fairness, derived from the expansion of the scope
of the conscientious objector exemption to include all objectors with-
out regard to religious belief thus seem to outweigh any costs incurred,
in terms of loss of manpower, and therefore this change in the draft
law is a desirable policy for Congress to pursue.
133 There is an extensive FBI investigation and a Department of Justice hearing report
for every appeal from the denial of the exemption by a local board. 32 C.F.R. § 1626.25
(1962).
134 SIBLEY & JACOB, CONSCIUPrxON OF CONSCIENCE, 315-19, 459-64 (1952); Crespi, Public
Opinion Toward Conscientious Objectors (pts. 2-3), 19 J. PSYCHOLOGY 209, 251 (1945).
Admission to the bar may be denied to an objector on that ground alone. In re Summers,
325 U.S. 561 (1945).
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